Tag Archives: swsec

Why We View AppSec Vulnerabilities As False

Firefighters in the lobby, false alarm, 4am. I’d like to say a few things as a follow-up to my article on theoretical appsec vulnerabilities last week. The article generated some interesting conversation about the idea. Jeff Williams seemed to asking what I thought was an interesting question, namely why do people push back on security analysis results? His take is that accuracy and false-alarms are the big reason and that tool vendors need to do better.

So let’s take a look at it. I’ve put up a new poll that takes a look at this question, so feel free to pop over there and let me know what you think. I’ll write about the results in the near future. In a previous poll about static analysis results in general, the largest answer was training, followed up by false positives and management.

In no particular order, here are some reasons why people justify ignoring the results from their security scanners.

Noise

Noise, noise, noise! However you call it, whether it’s false positives, false alarms, theoretical problems, too many messages or anything else, noise is a big pain. Jeff says accuracy matters and indeed it does. But in my experience developers are awfully quick to pull the “noise” trigger. It would be fun to do a poll/quiz with a couple of real code samples and see what developers think. The basic application security quiz at the AppSec Notes blog but doesn’t expose the knowledge issues around recognizing real security vulnerabilities in actual code. In other words, would you recognize why a piece of code is dangerous if you saw it? I’d like to see the quiz that has both good code and bad code examples and the question “security problem or ok”. This is trickier than it sounds at first because you can’t just have bad code and fixed code, you need bad code and then suspicious code that would likely raise a false alarm. Now there’s a real test. If anyone knows of such a beast or wants to build one, make sure to let me know.

Noise can be made even worse if you have false objectives and metrics. For example if you base success on “number of issues found” you’re likely to find the greatest number of unimportant issues. There are better definitions of success discussed in the presentation AppSec Broken Window Theory that is worth reading. One quick example is to track success by the number of “flaws not found” in new applications.

One other point on noise, particularly in the area of what people like to call false positives. I have the “Curmudgeon Law of Static Analysis Tool Usefulness”. The more clever a static analysis tool is, the more likely it’s output will be perceived as a false positive. This is because it’s easy to accept a result you understand, but if a tool tries to tell you something you don’t know (IE the most useful result) you are least likely to accept it. That’s why I keep pushing on a) better presentation of results to explain WHY it matters and b) better training.

Bad Workflow or Process

This is closely related to the noise problem. If you have a bad workflow, process, or configuration you will find your security scanning painful. Sometimes this pain is noise, sometimes it’s extra effort, slow work or other symptoms. For example I’d seen people scan static analysis on legacy code where the corporate policy was “no changes unless there is a field-reported bug”. Scanning code you don’t intend to fix or looking for items you don’t intend to fix certainly contributes to noise, effort required and costs.

The takeaway is make sure your tools are configured optimally and the way they integrate into your process is not causing headaches. I could go on a long time on this topic alone but we’ll save that for another day. How can you tell if it’s causing headaches? Ask those who are using the tools and those who are required to address the output of the tools.

Another great read on this topic is Does Progress Come From Security Products or Process where Gunnar Peterson says “Process engineering is deeply unsexy. It is about as far removed from the glamour, fashion show world of security conferences as you can possibly imagine, but its where the actual changes occur.

Prioritization

Again this is a category closely related to noise. Noise is a symptom of a lack of prioritization in your appsec findings. Ideally you’re storing all the output from your all the security tools in your arsenal in an intelligent data-driven system that will help you determine which items are most important. No one wants to spend weeks fixing something that is unlikely to happen and even if it did the consequences are minimal.

AppSec prioritization must take risk into account. Will this happen? Does this happen today? How hard is it to exploit? How hard is it to prevent? Plus all the other usual risk management questions. You know what to do, if you have too much noise from your tools, you need to put some intelligence behind it to get to what matters.

Note that when I say prioritization I don’t necessarily mean triage. Triage implies a human driven process (see bottleneck) that makes painful tradeoffs in a short time span rather than an orderly thought-out process. In the Broken Windows presentation I mentioned earlier Erik Peterson says “Triage != Application Security Program” and I wholeheartedly agree.

This is why I’m a fan of the attempt to develop comprehensive risk application frameworks. Some of these are the Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) that is managed at Mitre. CWSS proposes a way to properly weigh security findings in the context of your application, which should enable better automated prioritization. This goes hand-in-hand with the Common Weakness Risk Analysis Framework (CWRAF).

I know they’re far from perfect and in fact are frequently way too complicated and painful to use. Research in this area will ensure continued improvement and I expect it to ultimately become the critical driver in the appsec scanning space.

Test Security In

We’ve all heard the adage that you “can’t testing quality into an application”. This is based on Deming’s 3rd principle “cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality.” Early one many disagreed with Deming but today it’s an accepted truth that inspection alone will not solve your problems. Yet somehow in AppSec many believe that we can “test security into an application.” This attitude is easy to recognize because it results in security processes that are completely orthogonal to development, and are highlighted by all security activities being post-development QA-like activities. That method didn’t work for quality and won’t work for security.

In order to get ahead of the software security issues we have to start building secure software in the first place. There’s a great site sponsored by the US government called Build security in and it has lots of great information to get you going. Also take a look at the Building Security In Maturity Model. I realize that it’s easier to say “build it in” than it is to actually do and that building it in brings it’s own challenges. But like manufacturing and quality, it’s the only way to get long-term sustainable improvement.

Training

The SANS institute did a survey on application security programs and practices and found

“Although suppliers continue to improve the speed and accuracy of SAST tools and make them easier to use, developers need security training or expert help to understand what the tools are telling them, which vulnerabilities are important, why they need to be fixed and how to fix them.”

The report notes that only 26% of organizations had secure coding training that was working well or mandated. Further it reads

“A lack of knowledge and skills is holding back Appsec programs today, and it is preventing organizations from making real progress in Appsec in the future. The number one obstacle to success reported in this year’s survey is a shortage of skilled people, part of a bigger problem facing the IT security industry in general, as recent studies by Forrester Research13 and (ISC)214 show.

Training and education are needed to address this skills shortage—not just training more Infosec and Appsec specialists, but training developers and managers, too. Fewer than one-quarter of respondents have training programs that are ongoing and working well, and secure coding training ranks low in the list of practices that organizations depend on in their Appsec programs today. This needs to change. ”

OWASP talks about the importance of training

“From information security perspective, the holistic approach toward application security should include for example security training for software developers as well as security officers and managers…”

A survey in 2010 showed that security training was not being done and I suspect little has changed today.

“Nearly 80% of personnel at government agencies and contractors said their organization does not provide sufficient training and guidance for software security application development and delivery, according to a new survey.”

Summary

Tools alone and tool accuracy won’t fully answer the problems of AppSec. again from the Sans survey

“There aren’t any next generation tools or other silver bullets on the horizon that will solve the problem of secure software. Writing secure software is about fundamentals: thoughtful design, careful coding, disciplined testing and informed and responsible management. The sooner that organizations understand this—and start doing it—the sooner they will solve their security problems. ”

False alarms and accuracy are a huge problem. So is the lack of training. I wouldn’t want to argue that one is more important than the other, because I could easily find myself arguing both sides. Both are important. Until we have a perfect security tool, meaning no false alarms and equally important no false negatives training will play a necessary integral role to application security (appsec) and software security (swsec).

Unscientific AppSec Pain Poll

Here’s another one of my completely unscientific polls – this time about AppSec. I find it interesting to know what others think about these issues – if you have something you’d love to poll the Code Curmudgeon’s readers about, let me know in the comments.

Today’s poll is about the pain points in your AppSec tools. It might be SAST, DAST, IAST or anything else. What about it makes your the most crazy?

AppSec Resources

For articles related to this post see:
Theoretical AppSec Vulnerabilities
Why We View AppSec Vulnerabilities as False

For more security info check out the security resources page and a few of these books can help.
Embedded Systems Security: Practical Methods for Safe and Secure Software and Systems Development,

Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed: Safeguarding the Future of Computing with Intel Embedded Security and Management Engine,

Software Test Attacks to Break Mobile and Embedded Devices (Chapman & Hall/CRC Innovations in Software Engineering and Software Development Series)

Theoretical AppSec Vulnerabilities

As you’re well aware cybersecurity and appsec incidents are a regular feature in the news. I try to avoid jumping immediately on the analysis bandwagon, preferring instead to wait for a deeper understanding of what went wrong so we can think about how to avoid it in the future.

In this case I’d like to talk about the Superfish breach that was discovered on Lenovo laptops earlier this year.

In brief, Lenovo (like many if not most hardware manufacturers) chose to install software that allows them to advertise to their customers. I don’t wish to pick on them particularly in this case as the problem is rampant especially in the mobile arena. Rather lets think about Lenovo as a cautionary tale in how things can go wrong. The Superfish software installed on their laptops allows them to actually inject ads into the user stream. It did this by installing it’s own self-signed security certificate.

For those unfamiliar with the role of certificates in secure communication, certificates are supposed to certify that you are in fact who you say you are. This gives me confidence when my browser says I’m buying something from Amazon that it’s really Amazon and not some funny phishing web site trying to steal from me. I say supposed because you’re allowed to create a self-signed certificate which in essence is saying “I am who I say I am.” If this sounds scary, then you understand it.

The problem is even broader when it’s a self-signed root certificate. At this point you now have the person issuing the root certificate telling you “Everyone is who I say they are.” In other words, the certificate can convince your browser that Bob’s Criminal Bank™ is really your local bank. TNW News said “There is simply no reason for Superfish — or anyone else — to install a root certificate in this manner” and I wholeheartedly agree. TNW News again: “Either Superfish’s intent in installing one was malicious or due to sloppy development.”

Reasonable people can disagree on the tradeoff between advertising and privacy and ad-supported benefits like free email. This method of advertising however is beyond the scope of any responsible behavior. It puts users at great risk without any additional benefit. What reasonable people don’t do is put others at risk for their own benefit. Breaking security by stepping into the middle of secure transactions isn’t reasonable.

What’s interesting (or disturbing depending on your point of view) is how Lenovo responded to this problem. When researchers published the problem, the CTO of Lenovo said “We’re not trying to get into an argument with the security guys. They’re dealing with theoretical concerns. We have no insight that anything nefarious has occurred.”

Obviously I can’t tell you how much of their statement was spin and how much they really believed, I hope it was mostly the former. This is a great example of how not to have cybersecurity. It goes to the core of what we currently have so many appsec / swsec problems today. People want to simply patch up systems after a breach has occurred, rather than build fundamentally secure software using sound principles.

CSO online describes the reality quite well: “It’s a classic example of a Man-in-the-Middle attack, one that wouldn’t be too difficult to conduct based on the design of the software and its security protocols. Worse, the risk remains even after the user uninstalls the Visual Discovery software.”

The idea that a vulnerability is merely theoretical is not only ignorant but dangerous. Software exploits occur because bad actors operate by finding unexpected loopholes in a software system. Think of it this way – if you left your door unlocked is it a security issue? Or perhaps “If an unlocked door is never entered, is it really unlocked” if you’re a philosopher. One could contend that the risk is theoretical, but most of us would say that such a statement is ridiculous. (Props to those who live in an area where door security isn’t required.)

Software vulnerabilities are exactly like unlocked doors. They are not theoretical, they are actual whole or openings in your software than can and probably will be exploited. If we went to have secure applications we must grow up and stop pretending that the vulnerabilities we’re facing aren’t real. We have to move a proactive preventative engineering based approach that treats vulnerabilities as real risks, only then can we be secure.

[Update – Jeff Williams who I respect a lot as a long-term advocate of software security had a comment about this. For some reason my comment system currently seems broken, so I”m posting a link to his response on LinkedIn. I do agree that tool noise or false alarm rates are problematic in security analysis tools, but I don’t agree that this lets company representatives and developers off the hook for claiming theoretical.]

[Update – I get that there are exploits that are theoretical. My point is that the label is misused by those who are trying to avoid fixing a problem or taking responsibility. For example early Heartbleed responses were full of “it’s theoretical“, which was also true for the airline wifi attack demonstrated against United. I certainly don’t disagree that there is such a thing as a theoretical exploit, but sometimes we spend more effort trying to disprove the exploit than the effort that would be necessary to fix it.]

[Update – I wrote a follow-up discussing why people might call a vulnerability false or theoretical.]

Resources

Top 10 User Mistakes with Static Analysis

mistake © by doobybrain

I recently attended the Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE) IV Workshopsponsored by NIST. The goals of SATE are to:

  • Enable empirical research based on large test sets
  • Encourage improvement of tools
  • Speed adoption of tools by objectively demonstrating their use on real software

I find SATE interesting because it takes a couple of different approaches that are pretty useful to people trying to understand what static analysis can and cannot due. One approach is to have several full-fledged applications with known bugs, and versions of the application with those bugs fixed. These have the effect of showing what static analysis tools can do in the real world. Unfortunately, they don’t help much when trying to find out what kinds of issues static analysis can handle overall.

To do that, NIST has developed a test suite that has thousands of test cases with specific issues in them. Part of SATE is running various tools on the test applications and test suites, and then trying to analyze what they can find, how much noise they produce, etc. It’s an interesting exercise. You should check it out.

This year I was privileged give a presentation myself. I wanted to talk about some of the pragmatic aspects of actually trying to use static analysis in the real world. To that end, I created a slide show around the top 10 user mistakes, meaning things that prevent organizations from realizing the value they expected or needed from static analysis. These range from improper configuration to poor policy to dealing with noise.

Take a look for yourself. If you love or hate any of them, let me know. If you have others I missed, feel free to mention it in the comments, or email me or reach me on twitter.

(powerpoint) (pdf)

Download (PPT, 1.52MB)

Resources